Private
Public Access
ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5
0ab23c44a7
Bot accounts (User rows with is_bot=True), scoped API tokens (read:messages, write:messages, manage:rooms) authenticated via Authorization: Bearer on both REST and the WS handshake, live bot WebSocket access on the same /ws/chat endpoint humans use, message editing (WS "edit" envelope -> message_update broadcast, fans out cross-instance for free via the existing broadcaster), incoming webhooks (room-scoped, no auth beyond the URL token), and outgoing webhooks/event subscriptions (HMAC-SHA256 signed, backgrounded delivery, creation-time SSRF validation against private/loopback/link-local targets). Token auth is additive, not a parallel system: a bearer-token-authenticated bot goes through the exact same room-membership/role checks a session- authenticated human does everywhere; only read:messages/write:messages are separately scope-gated (the two message endpoints). manage:rooms scope enforcement, full per-delivery SSRF re-validation, and bot API rate limiting were explicitly scoped out (confirmed with the repo owner) as disproportionate to this phase -- documented as known gaps in backend/README.md rather than silently skipped. Admin portal gains a Bots tab (create bots, issue/revoke scoped tokens, cross-room webhook visibility); RoomInfoPanel gains room-scoped webhook/ subscription management, mirroring how invites already work there. The chat UI also gets a minimal "edit your own message" affordance -- not asked for by the issue, but the only practical way to exercise the edit pipeline by hand instead of only via a scripted bot client. Along the way: fixed a real bug caught while writing the incoming-webhook test -- offline-push notification relied on the sender being "connected" to exclude themselves, true for WS-originated messages but not for the new webhook path, which has no WS connection for the attributed sender at all. Now explicitly excluded. Also discovered the REST-only test fixture never triggered ASGI lifespan, so app.state.broadcaster/presence didn't exist for it; moved their construction out of the lifespan into create_app() itself (Redis client construction is synchronous/lazy) so both the WS and REST-only paths always have them. New tests/test_bots.py, test_message_edit.py, test_webhooks.py (full suite now 78/78, stable across repeated runs) plus a scripted end-to-end smoke test (bot WS join/post/edit, incoming webhook, SSRF rejection, outgoing delivery) and a full browser walkthrough of the new admin/room UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Python
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Python
import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import logging
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import httpx
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from app.models import EventSubscription
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
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async def deliver_event(subscription: EventSubscription, event_type: str, payload: dict) -> None:
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"""POST a signed event to a subscription's target_url.
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Fire-once, best-effort: no retry/backoff, any failure is logged and
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swallowed rather than raised -- a slow or dead third-party endpoint must
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never affect message delivery to real room members. Safe to run in a
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background asyncio.create_task (unlike the Phase 4 push lesson) because
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there's no DB session involved here, just the already-serialized
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payload and secret -- nothing that can outlive an event loop.
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"""
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body = json.dumps({"event": event_type, "data": payload}).encode()
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signature = hmac.new(subscription.signing_secret.encode(), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as client:
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await client.post(
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subscription.target_url,
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content=body,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-KeepItTalking-Signature": f"sha256={signature}",
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},
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)
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except httpx.HTTPError:
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logger.warning(
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"Failed to deliver %s event to subscription %s", event_type, subscription.id
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)
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