Private
Public Access
base.py's env.str() fallback is a publicly known string in this repo's history. Running prod settings with it (an unset or forgotten .env value) would sign sessions/CSRF tokens with a key anyone can read. install.sh already generates a real random key for fresh installs, so this only blocks the broken case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
95 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
95 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured
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from .base import * # noqa: F403
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from .base import SECRET_KEY, env
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DEBUG = False
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# base.py falls back to a publicly known placeholder if SECRET_KEY isn't
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# set — fine for a throwaway dev DB, but production must never sign
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# sessions/CSRF tokens with a key anyone can read in this repo's history.
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# Fail startup rather than quietly running with a known key.
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if not SECRET_KEY or SECRET_KEY == "django-insecure-change-me-in-production":
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raise ImproperlyConfigured(
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"SECRET_KEY is missing or still the placeholder default. Set a unique, "
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"random SECRET_KEY in .env before running with prod settings — generate "
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'one with: python -c "from django.core.management.utils import '
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'get_random_secret_key; print(get_random_secret_key())"'
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)
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# Health checks (scripts/upgrade.sh, an external uptime monitor, ...) hit
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# gunicorn directly over loopback, bypassing the reverse proxy entirely —
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# that request's Host header is "127.0.0.1:<port>", not the public domain
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# in ALLOWED_HOSTS, so without this Django 400s it. Harmless to always
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# allow: gunicorn's bind address is never reachable from outside this host
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# in the first place (see docs/install.md's "Reverse proxy" section).
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ALLOWED_HOSTS = [*ALLOWED_HOSTS, "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"] # noqa: F405
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# A reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Traefik, Nginx Proxy Manager on another
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# host, ...) is required in front of gunicorn in every deployment — see
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# docs/install.md — and it's always the one terminating TLS. This tells
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# Django's request.is_secure() to trust the X-Forwarded-Proto header it
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# sets, and the redirect/cookie/HSTS settings below assume it's set.
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SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT = env.bool("SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT", default=True)
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SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER = ("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO", "https")
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# /health/ is also exempted from the HTTPS redirect above: hit directly
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# over loopback (see ALLOWED_HOSTS above) it has no X-Forwarded-Proto
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# header to prove it's "secure", and there's no TLS listener on gunicorn's
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# own port to redirect to anyway.
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SECURE_REDIRECT_EXEMPT = [r"^health/$"]
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# WhiteNoise serves /static/ directly from gunicorn instead of relying on
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# the reverse proxy to alias the staticfiles directory on disk — the proxy
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# may not even be on this host (see docs/install.md), so it can't be
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# trusted to have filesystem access to $APP_DIR/staticfiles.
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MIDDLEWARE = [
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"django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware",
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"whitenoise.middleware.WhiteNoiseMiddleware",
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*MIDDLEWARE[1:], # noqa: F405
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]
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STORAGES = {
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"default": {"BACKEND": "django.core.files.storage.FileSystemStorage"},
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"staticfiles": {
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"BACKEND": "whitenoise.storage.CompressedManifestStaticFilesStorage",
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},
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}
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SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True
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CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = True
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SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE = "Lax"
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CSRF_COOKIE_SAMESITE = "Lax"
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SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS = env.int("SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS", default=60 * 60 * 24 * 7)
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SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS = True
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SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD = True
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SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF = True
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SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY = "same-origin"
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X_FRAME_OPTIONS = "DENY"
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INSTALLED_APPS = [*INSTALLED_APPS, "csp"] # noqa: F405
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MIDDLEWARE = ["csp.middleware.CSPMiddleware", *MIDDLEWARE] # noqa: F405
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# nh3 already strips <script>/<style>/on* attrs/<iframe> from stored article
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# HTML at ingest (see apps.feeds.services.fetcher.sanitize_html); this is a
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# second, independent layer against any sanitizer gap, and against any
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# future template that forgets to escape feed-supplied text. Remote article
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# images are rendered directly (not proxied, see the PWA offline-caching
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# limitation in the plan), so img-src has to allow any https host.
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CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY = {
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"DIRECTIVES": {
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"default-src": ["'self'"],
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"img-src": ["'self'", "https:", "data:"],
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# Tag pills render a per-tag color via a dynamic inline style="--tag-
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# color: ..." attribute (templates/articles/_article_tags.html etc.),
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# so style-src needs 'unsafe-inline'. script-src stays strict with no
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# exception — every <script> in the app is loaded from a static file
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# (see templates/base.html), none inline.
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"style-src": ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
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"script-src": ["'self'"],
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"frame-ancestors": ["'none'"],
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"base-uri": ["'self'"],
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"form-action": ["'self'"],
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}
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}
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