S4: the throttle keyed on the first X-Forwarded-For entry, which a client
or a proxy that appends can choose, and disabled itself entirely when
Redis was down.
EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES (IPs/CIDRs of your reverse proxy) makes it
strict: X-Forwarded-For is only believed when the TCP peer is a trusted
proxy, and the rightmost entry that isn't itself a trusted proxy — the
address the proxy actually saw — is used instead of the spoofable first
one. Unset keeps the previous behavior so existing installs don't
suddenly share one bucket behind a proxy, and `manage.py check --deploy`
warns (evection.W001) until it's set. During a Redis outage the throttle
now falls back to a bounded in-process limiter instead of switching off.
C5: /health/ready/ reuses its queue/feed aggregates for 15s
(EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS) so a fast-polling monitor can't create
steady load; the database, Redis and poller probes stay live. Docs
cover both settings, restricting the endpoint at the proxy, and the
tombstone/purge behavior from the previous changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ingestion did a get_or_create per entry. It now prefetches existing
articles for the poll in one query, bulk-inserts new ones and
bulk-updates changed ones (falling back to row-by-row only if a
concurrent fetch wins a race), and dispatches rule evaluation in
bounded chunks so a huge first fetch is several small tasks.
/health/ stays a DB-only liveness check (upgrade.sh gates on it right
after restart). New /health/ready/ also checks Redis and that
poll_due_feeds ticked within five minutes — proving beat and a worker
are both alive — and returns 503 with per-check detail otherwise.
The sidebar unread-count cache and login throttle now degrade instead
of erroring when Redis is unreachable: every authenticated page and
every login would otherwise 500 during a cache outage. Found while
verifying in a sandbox with no Redis.
Also includes the dashboard's oldest-article metric (core/views.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Django's default LoginView had no throttle — an internet-facing
instance was exposed to unlimited password-guessing/credential-
stuffing attempts. apps.accounts.views.LoginView adds two independent,
Redis-cache-backed throttles (shared across all gunicorn workers,
unlike the per-process default LocMemCache): by client address (catches
one attacker spraying many usernames) and by the submitted username
(catches a distributed attack on one specific account). Either blocks
further attempts for a 5-minute window; both are generous enough not
to lock out a user who's just mistyped their own password a few times.
Client address prefers X-Forwarded-For's first hop, falling back to
REMOTE_ADDR — the same reverse-proxy trust boundary config.settings.prod
already relies on for X-Forwarded-Proto (gunicorn is never meant to be
reachable except through that proxy).
CACHES now points at Redis (already a hard install requirement for
Celery) instead of Django's implicit per-process default, since the
whole point is a shared counter across every gunicorn worker; test
settings override it back to LocMemCache so the suite doesn't need a
real Redis instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>