Files
Evection/apps/accounts/test_rate_limit.py
T
ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5 a1ea2e5662 Add login rate limiting (S6)
Django's default LoginView had no throttle — an internet-facing
instance was exposed to unlimited password-guessing/credential-
stuffing attempts. apps.accounts.views.LoginView adds two independent,
Redis-cache-backed throttles (shared across all gunicorn workers,
unlike the per-process default LocMemCache): by client address (catches
one attacker spraying many usernames) and by the submitted username
(catches a distributed attack on one specific account). Either blocks
further attempts for a 5-minute window; both are generous enough not
to lock out a user who's just mistyped their own password a few times.

Client address prefers X-Forwarded-For's first hop, falling back to
REMOTE_ADDR — the same reverse-proxy trust boundary config.settings.prod
already relies on for X-Forwarded-Proto (gunicorn is never meant to be
reachable except through that proxy).

CACHES now points at Redis (already a hard install requirement for
Celery) instead of Django's implicit per-process default, since the
whole point is a shared counter across every gunicorn worker; test
settings override it back to LocMemCache so the suite doesn't need a
real Redis instance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-31 12:46:49 -06:00

75 lines
2.3 KiB
Python

import pytest
from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
from django.core.cache import cache
from django.urls import reverse
from .views import (
LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS,
LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME,
)
User = get_user_model()
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _clear_rate_limit_cache():
cache.clear()
yield
cache.clear()
@pytest.fixture
def alice(db):
return User.objects.create_user("alice", password="pw-alice-123")
def _bad_login(client, username="alice"):
return client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": username, "password": "wrong"})
@pytest.mark.django_db
def test_a_single_failed_login_still_shows_the_normal_error(client, alice):
response = _bad_login(client)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert b"Please enter a correct" in response.content or response.context["form"].errors
@pytest.mark.django_db
def test_correct_credentials_succeed_before_the_limit_is_hit(client, alice):
for _ in range(3):
_bad_login(client)
response = client.post(
reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"}
)
assert response.status_code == 302
@pytest.mark.django_db
def test_too_many_failed_attempts_from_one_address_blocks_further_tries(client, alice):
for _ in range(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS):
_bad_login(client)
# Even the correct password is now refused — the throttle runs
# before the form is ever validated.
response = client.post(
reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"}
)
assert response.status_code == 302
assert response.url == reverse("accounts:login")
assert not response.wsgi_request.user.is_authenticated
@pytest.mark.django_db
def test_too_many_failed_attempts_against_one_username_blocks_that_username(client, alice):
bob = User.objects.create_user("bob", password="pw-bob-123")
for _ in range(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME):
_bad_login(client, username="alice")
# Same client address, different username — the per-username
# throttle for "alice" shouldn't affect bob logging in.
response = client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "bob", "password": "pw-bob-123"})
assert response.status_code == 302
assert response.wsgi_request.user == bob