Private
Public Access
Bot accounts (User rows with is_bot=True), scoped API tokens (read:messages, write:messages, manage:rooms) authenticated via Authorization: Bearer on both REST and the WS handshake, live bot WebSocket access on the same /ws/chat endpoint humans use, message editing (WS "edit" envelope -> message_update broadcast, fans out cross-instance for free via the existing broadcaster), incoming webhooks (room-scoped, no auth beyond the URL token), and outgoing webhooks/event subscriptions (HMAC-SHA256 signed, backgrounded delivery, creation-time SSRF validation against private/loopback/link-local targets). Token auth is additive, not a parallel system: a bearer-token-authenticated bot goes through the exact same room-membership/role checks a session- authenticated human does everywhere; only read:messages/write:messages are separately scope-gated (the two message endpoints). manage:rooms scope enforcement, full per-delivery SSRF re-validation, and bot API rate limiting were explicitly scoped out (confirmed with the repo owner) as disproportionate to this phase -- documented as known gaps in backend/README.md rather than silently skipped. Admin portal gains a Bots tab (create bots, issue/revoke scoped tokens, cross-room webhook visibility); RoomInfoPanel gains room-scoped webhook/ subscription management, mirroring how invites already work there. The chat UI also gets a minimal "edit your own message" affordance -- not asked for by the issue, but the only practical way to exercise the edit pipeline by hand instead of only via a scripted bot client. Along the way: fixed a real bug caught while writing the incoming-webhook test -- offline-push notification relied on the sender being "connected" to exclude themselves, true for WS-originated messages but not for the new webhook path, which has no WS connection for the attributed sender at all. Now explicitly excluded. Also discovered the REST-only test fixture never triggered ASGI lifespan, so app.state.broadcaster/presence didn't exist for it; moved their construction out of the lifespan into create_app() itself (Redis client construction is synchronous/lazy) so both the WS and REST-only paths always have them. New tests/test_bots.py, test_message_edit.py, test_webhooks.py (full suite now 78/78, stable across repeated runs) plus a scripted end-to-end smoke test (bot WS join/post/edit, incoming webhook, SSRF rejection, outgoing delivery) and a full browser walkthrough of the new admin/room UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
120 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
120 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
import uuid
|
|
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
|
|
|
from sqlalchemy import select
|
|
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
|
|
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
|
|
from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
|
|
|
|
from app.models import ApiToken, User
|
|
from app.security import generate_token, hash_password, hash_token
|
|
from app.services.audit import record_audit_log
|
|
|
|
VALID_SCOPES = {"read:messages", "write:messages", "manage:rooms"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
class DuplicateBotError(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
class BotNotFoundError(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
class InvalidScopeError(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TokenNotFoundError(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def create_bot(db: AsyncSession, actor: User, username: str) -> User:
|
|
# Bots never authenticate with a password -- generate one and discard
|
|
# it. email is NOT NULL/unique today; a placeholder avoids widening the
|
|
# schema just for accounts that will never receive real mail.
|
|
# bots.example.com (not e.g. bots.local/.invalid) deliberately, since
|
|
# pydantic's EmailStr rejects addresses whose *top-level* domain is one
|
|
# of the IANA special-use TLDs (.local, .invalid, .test, ...) -- a
|
|
# subdomain of the real (if reserved-for-docs) .com TLD isn't affected.
|
|
bot = User(
|
|
username=username,
|
|
email=f"{username}@bots.example.com",
|
|
password_hash=hash_password(generate_token()),
|
|
is_bot=True,
|
|
)
|
|
db.add(bot)
|
|
try:
|
|
await db.flush()
|
|
except IntegrityError as exc:
|
|
await db.rollback()
|
|
raise DuplicateBotError() from exc
|
|
|
|
record_audit_log(db, actor, "bot.create", "user", bot.id)
|
|
await db.commit()
|
|
await db.refresh(bot)
|
|
return bot
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def list_bots(db: AsyncSession) -> list[User]:
|
|
result = await db.execute(
|
|
select(User).where(User.is_bot.is_(True)).order_by(User.created_at)
|
|
)
|
|
return list(result.scalars().all())
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _get_bot(db: AsyncSession, bot_id: uuid.UUID) -> User:
|
|
bot = await db.get(User, bot_id)
|
|
if bot is None or not bot.is_bot:
|
|
raise BotNotFoundError()
|
|
return bot
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def create_api_token(
|
|
db: AsyncSession, actor: User, bot_id: uuid.UUID, scopes: list[str]
|
|
) -> tuple[ApiToken, str]:
|
|
bot = await _get_bot(db, bot_id)
|
|
if not set(scopes) <= VALID_SCOPES:
|
|
raise InvalidScopeError()
|
|
|
|
plaintext = generate_token()
|
|
token = ApiToken(owner_id=bot.id, token_hash=hash_token(plaintext), scopes=scopes)
|
|
db.add(token)
|
|
record_audit_log(
|
|
db, actor, "bot.issue_token", "user", bot.id, {"scopes": scopes}
|
|
)
|
|
await db.commit()
|
|
await db.refresh(token)
|
|
return token, plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def list_api_tokens(db: AsyncSession, bot_id: uuid.UUID) -> list[ApiToken]:
|
|
result = await db.execute(
|
|
select(ApiToken).where(ApiToken.owner_id == bot_id).order_by(ApiToken.created_at)
|
|
)
|
|
return list(result.scalars().all())
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def revoke_api_token(db: AsyncSession, actor: User, token_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
|
|
token = await db.get(ApiToken, token_id)
|
|
if token is None:
|
|
raise TokenNotFoundError()
|
|
await db.delete(token)
|
|
record_audit_log(db, actor, "bot.revoke_token", "user", token.owner_id)
|
|
await db.commit()
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def resolve_token(db: AsyncSession, plaintext: str) -> tuple[User, ApiToken] | None:
|
|
result = await db.execute(
|
|
select(ApiToken)
|
|
.where(ApiToken.token_hash == hash_token(plaintext))
|
|
.options(selectinload(ApiToken.owner))
|
|
)
|
|
token = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
|
if token is None or not token.owner.is_active:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
token.last_used_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
|
await db.commit()
|
|
return token.owner, token
|