Private
Public Access
ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5
0ab23c44a7
Bot accounts (User rows with is_bot=True), scoped API tokens (read:messages, write:messages, manage:rooms) authenticated via Authorization: Bearer on both REST and the WS handshake, live bot WebSocket access on the same /ws/chat endpoint humans use, message editing (WS "edit" envelope -> message_update broadcast, fans out cross-instance for free via the existing broadcaster), incoming webhooks (room-scoped, no auth beyond the URL token), and outgoing webhooks/event subscriptions (HMAC-SHA256 signed, backgrounded delivery, creation-time SSRF validation against private/loopback/link-local targets). Token auth is additive, not a parallel system: a bearer-token-authenticated bot goes through the exact same room-membership/role checks a session- authenticated human does everywhere; only read:messages/write:messages are separately scope-gated (the two message endpoints). manage:rooms scope enforcement, full per-delivery SSRF re-validation, and bot API rate limiting were explicitly scoped out (confirmed with the repo owner) as disproportionate to this phase -- documented as known gaps in backend/README.md rather than silently skipped. Admin portal gains a Bots tab (create bots, issue/revoke scoped tokens, cross-room webhook visibility); RoomInfoPanel gains room-scoped webhook/ subscription management, mirroring how invites already work there. The chat UI also gets a minimal "edit your own message" affordance -- not asked for by the issue, but the only practical way to exercise the edit pipeline by hand instead of only via a scripted bot client. Along the way: fixed a real bug caught while writing the incoming-webhook test -- offline-push notification relied on the sender being "connected" to exclude themselves, true for WS-originated messages but not for the new webhook path, which has no WS connection for the attributed sender at all. Now explicitly excluded. Also discovered the REST-only test fixture never triggered ASGI lifespan, so app.state.broadcaster/presence didn't exist for it; moved their construction out of the lifespan into create_app() itself (Redis client construction is synchronous/lazy) so both the WS and REST-only paths always have them. New tests/test_bots.py, test_message_edit.py, test_webhooks.py (full suite now 78/78, stable across repeated runs) plus a scripted end-to-end smoke test (bot WS join/post/edit, incoming webhook, SSRF rejection, outgoing delivery) and a full browser walkthrough of the new admin/room UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
39 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
import ipaddress
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import socket
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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class UnsafeWebhookUrlError(Exception):
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pass
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def validate_target_url(url: str) -> None:
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"""Creation-time-only SSRF check: rejects non-http(s) schemes and any
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target whose hostname resolves to a private/loopback/link-local/
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reserved/multicast address. Not re-checked per delivery, so this doesn't
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defend against DNS rebinding between creation and a later send -- a
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documented known limitation, not an oversight.
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"""
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parsed = urlparse(url)
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if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
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raise UnsafeWebhookUrlError()
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if not parsed.hostname:
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raise UnsafeWebhookUrlError()
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try:
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addrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, None)
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except socket.gaierror as exc:
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raise UnsafeWebhookUrlError() from exc
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for *_rest, sockaddr in addrinfo:
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
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if (
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ip.is_private
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or ip.is_loopback
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or ip.is_link_local
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or ip.is_reserved
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or ip.is_multicast
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or ip.is_unspecified
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):
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raise UnsafeWebhookUrlError()
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