Private
Public Access
ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5
0ab23c44a7
Bot accounts (User rows with is_bot=True), scoped API tokens (read:messages, write:messages, manage:rooms) authenticated via Authorization: Bearer on both REST and the WS handshake, live bot WebSocket access on the same /ws/chat endpoint humans use, message editing (WS "edit" envelope -> message_update broadcast, fans out cross-instance for free via the existing broadcaster), incoming webhooks (room-scoped, no auth beyond the URL token), and outgoing webhooks/event subscriptions (HMAC-SHA256 signed, backgrounded delivery, creation-time SSRF validation against private/loopback/link-local targets). Token auth is additive, not a parallel system: a bearer-token-authenticated bot goes through the exact same room-membership/role checks a session- authenticated human does everywhere; only read:messages/write:messages are separately scope-gated (the two message endpoints). manage:rooms scope enforcement, full per-delivery SSRF re-validation, and bot API rate limiting were explicitly scoped out (confirmed with the repo owner) as disproportionate to this phase -- documented as known gaps in backend/README.md rather than silently skipped. Admin portal gains a Bots tab (create bots, issue/revoke scoped tokens, cross-room webhook visibility); RoomInfoPanel gains room-scoped webhook/ subscription management, mirroring how invites already work there. The chat UI also gets a minimal "edit your own message" affordance -- not asked for by the issue, but the only practical way to exercise the edit pipeline by hand instead of only via a scripted bot client. Along the way: fixed a real bug caught while writing the incoming-webhook test -- offline-push notification relied on the sender being "connected" to exclude themselves, true for WS-originated messages but not for the new webhook path, which has no WS connection for the attributed sender at all. Now explicitly excluded. Also discovered the REST-only test fixture never triggered ASGI lifespan, so app.state.broadcaster/presence didn't exist for it; moved their construction out of the lifespan into create_app() itself (Redis client construction is synchronous/lazy) so both the WS and REST-only paths always have them. New tests/test_bots.py, test_message_edit.py, test_webhooks.py (full suite now 78/78, stable across repeated runs) plus a scripted end-to-end smoke test (bot WS join/post/edit, incoming webhook, SSRF rejection, outgoing delivery) and a full browser walkthrough of the new admin/room UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
912 B
Python
32 lines
912 B
Python
import hashlib
|
|
import secrets
|
|
|
|
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
|
|
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
|
|
|
|
_hasher = PasswordHasher()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
|
|
return _hasher.hash(password)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
|
|
try:
|
|
return _hasher.verify(password_hash, password)
|
|
except VerifyMismatchError:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def generate_token() -> str:
|
|
return f"kit_{secrets.token_urlsafe(32)}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def hash_token(token: str) -> str:
|
|
# Deterministic (not argon2) is deliberate: a bearer token has to be
|
|
# looked up *by itself* (no username to look up first, unlike a
|
|
# password), and argon2's per-call random salt makes that impossible.
|
|
# A fast hash of a high-entropy 256-bit random token is the standard
|
|
# approach for API keys (same as GitHub/Stripe).
|
|
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
|