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Django's default LoginView had no throttle — an internet-facing instance was exposed to unlimited password-guessing/credential- stuffing attempts. apps.accounts.views.LoginView adds two independent, Redis-cache-backed throttles (shared across all gunicorn workers, unlike the per-process default LocMemCache): by client address (catches one attacker spraying many usernames) and by the submitted username (catches a distributed attack on one specific account). Either blocks further attempts for a 5-minute window; both are generous enough not to lock out a user who's just mistyped their own password a few times. Client address prefers X-Forwarded-For's first hop, falling back to REMOTE_ADDR — the same reverse-proxy trust boundary config.settings.prod already relies on for X-Forwarded-Proto (gunicorn is never meant to be reachable except through that proxy). CACHES now points at Redis (already a hard install requirement for Celery) instead of Django's implicit per-process default, since the whole point is a shared counter across every gunicorn worker; test settings override it back to LocMemCache so the suite doesn't need a real Redis instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
75 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
import pytest
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from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
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from django.core.cache import cache
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from django.urls import reverse
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from .views import (
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LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS,
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LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME,
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)
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User = get_user_model()
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _clear_rate_limit_cache():
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cache.clear()
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yield
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cache.clear()
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@pytest.fixture
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def alice(db):
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return User.objects.create_user("alice", password="pw-alice-123")
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def _bad_login(client, username="alice"):
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return client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": username, "password": "wrong"})
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_a_single_failed_login_still_shows_the_normal_error(client, alice):
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response = _bad_login(client)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert b"Please enter a correct" in response.content or response.context["form"].errors
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_correct_credentials_succeed_before_the_limit_is_hit(client, alice):
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for _ in range(3):
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_bad_login(client)
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response = client.post(
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reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 302
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_too_many_failed_attempts_from_one_address_blocks_further_tries(client, alice):
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for _ in range(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS):
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_bad_login(client)
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# Even the correct password is now refused — the throttle runs
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# before the form is ever validated.
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response = client.post(
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reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 302
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assert response.url == reverse("accounts:login")
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assert not response.wsgi_request.user.is_authenticated
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_too_many_failed_attempts_against_one_username_blocks_that_username(client, alice):
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bob = User.objects.create_user("bob", password="pw-bob-123")
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for _ in range(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME):
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_bad_login(client, username="alice")
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# Same client address, different username — the per-username
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# throttle for "alice" shouldn't affect bob logging in.
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response = client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "bob", "password": "pw-bob-123"})
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assert response.status_code == 302
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assert response.wsgi_request.user == bob
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