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A feed's channel link, an entry's link and an OPML htmlUrl were stored as given and rendered in href attributes (bulk writes skip model validation), so a malicious feed could supply a javascript: or data: link. CSP is a second layer, not the control. apps.core.urlutils accepts only absolute http(s) URLs. Fetching stores channel/entry links through it — relative links now resolve against the feed's own URL instead of being stored as dead relative paths — OPML import skips non-http(s) feed URLs and blanks unsafe htmlUrl, and the add-feed form rejects non-http(s) (URLField also allows ftp). A safe_http_url template filter guards the two places a feed-supplied URL becomes a link (the article's "Original" link and the dashboard), so values already in the database from before this fix are neutralized too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
22 lines
1.1 KiB
HTML
22 lines
1.1 KiB
HTML
{% load safe_urls %}<div class="article-content-header">
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<h2 class="article-content-title">{{ article.title|default:"(untitled)" }}</h2>
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<p class="article-meta">
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{% if article.feed.favicon_url %}<img src="{{ article.feed.favicon_url }}" alt="" class="feed-favicon">{% endif %}
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{{ article.feed.title }}
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{# fetched_at stands in when the feed gave no publish date #}
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· <time datetime="{{ article.published_at|default:article.fetched_at|date:"c" }}" data-local-format="long">{{ article.published_at|default:article.fetched_at|date:"M j, Y H:i" }}</time>
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{% if article.author %} · {{ article.author }}{% endif %}
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{% with safe_link=article.link|safe_http_url %}{% if safe_link %} · <a href="{{ safe_link }}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Original ↗</a>{% endif %}{% endwith %}
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</p>
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<div
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id="article-tags-{{ article.pk }}"
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hx-get="{% url 'articles:article_tags_partial' article.pk %}"
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hx-trigger="load"
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hx-swap="outerHTML"></div>
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</div>
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<div class="article-content">
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{{ article.content_html|safe }}
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</div>
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