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ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5.5 41f99e9405 Allow only http(s) URLs from feeds and OPML, at storage and render (R2-S1, #33)
A feed's channel link, an entry's link and an OPML htmlUrl were stored
as given and rendered in href attributes (bulk writes skip model
validation), so a malicious feed could supply a javascript: or data:
link. CSP is a second layer, not the control.

apps.core.urlutils accepts only absolute http(s) URLs. Fetching stores
channel/entry links through it — relative links now resolve against the
feed's own URL instead of being stored as dead relative paths — OPML
import skips non-http(s) feed URLs and blanks unsafe htmlUrl, and the
add-feed form rejects non-http(s) (URLField also allows ftp). A
safe_http_url template filter guards the two places a feed-supplied URL
becomes a link (the article's "Original" link and the dashboard), so
values already in the database from before this fix are neutralized too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 11:57:23 -07:00

31 lines
1.1 KiB
Python

from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlsplit
ALLOWED_SCHEMES = {"http", "https"}
def http_url_or_empty(value: str | None) -> str:
"""The URL if it's an absolute http(s) URL, else "". Feed content is
untrusted: a link of "javascript:..." or "data:..." is harmless inside
an escaped attribute value but becomes script the moment someone
clicks it, so every URL we store from a feed or OPML file, and every
one we render as a link, goes through this. (urlsplit already ignores
the tab/newline tricks browsers also ignore inside a scheme.)"""
if not value:
return ""
value = value.strip()
try:
parts = urlsplit(value)
except ValueError:
return ""
if parts.scheme.lower() not in ALLOWED_SCHEMES or not parts.netloc:
return ""
return value
def resolve_http_url(base: str, value: str | None) -> str:
"""Like http_url_or_empty, but first resolves a relative link (feeds
often give "/2026/post") against the feed's own URL."""
if not value:
return ""
return http_url_or_empty(urljoin(base, value.strip()))