S4: the throttle keyed on the first X-Forwarded-For entry, which a client
or a proxy that appends can choose, and disabled itself entirely when
Redis was down.
EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES (IPs/CIDRs of your reverse proxy) makes it
strict: X-Forwarded-For is only believed when the TCP peer is a trusted
proxy, and the rightmost entry that isn't itself a trusted proxy — the
address the proxy actually saw — is used instead of the spoofable first
one. Unset keeps the previous behavior so existing installs don't
suddenly share one bucket behind a proxy, and `manage.py check --deploy`
warns (evection.W001) until it's set. During a Redis outage the throttle
now falls back to a bounded in-process limiter instead of switching off.
C5: /health/ready/ reuses its queue/feed aggregates for 15s
(EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS) so a fast-polling monitor can't create
steady load; the database, Redis and poller probes stay live. Docs
cover both settings, restricting the endpoint at the proxy, and the
tombstone/purge behavior from the previous changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/health/ready/ proved beat and a worker were alive but not that
fetching worked: every feed could be failing, or the queue could be
hours behind, and it would still report ok.
apps.core.health adds three checks: Celery queue depth (real Redis list
length, over 1000 fails), a successful fetch within three poll intervals
(30 min minimum, with a grace period for a brand-new install), and the
share of active feeds failing (over half, once there are at least four).
The payload also reports queue depth, active/failing feed counts, and
the age of the last successful fetch. Verified against real Redis with
queued Celery tasks, and the suite on PostgreSQL. docs/install.md lists
each check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>