Private
Public Access
S4: the throttle keyed on the first X-Forwarded-For entry, which a client or a proxy that appends can choose, and disabled itself entirely when Redis was down. EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES (IPs/CIDRs of your reverse proxy) makes it strict: X-Forwarded-For is only believed when the TCP peer is a trusted proxy, and the rightmost entry that isn't itself a trusted proxy — the address the proxy actually saw — is used instead of the spoofable first one. Unset keeps the previous behavior so existing installs don't suddenly share one bucket behind a proxy, and `manage.py check --deploy` warns (evection.W001) until it's set. During a Redis outage the throttle now falls back to a bounded in-process limiter instead of switching off. C5: /health/ready/ reuses its queue/feed aggregates for 15s (EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS) so a fast-polling monitor can't create steady load; the database, Redis and poller probes stay live. Docs cover both settings, restricting the endpoint at the proxy, and the tombstone/purge behavior from the previous changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -4,3 +4,6 @@ from django.apps import AppConfig
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class AccountsConfig(AppConfig):
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default_auto_field = "django.db.models.BigAutoField"
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name = "apps.accounts"
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def ready(self):
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from . import checks # noqa: F401 (registers the deploy check)
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.core.checks import Tags, Warning, register
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@register(Tags.security, deploy=True)
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def trusted_proxies_configured(app_configs, **kwargs):
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if settings.DEBUG or settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES:
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return []
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return [
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Warning(
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"EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES is not set.",
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hint=(
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"The login throttle then trusts the first X-Forwarded-For entry from "
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"anyone, which only holds while gunicorn is reachable by nothing but a "
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"proxy that overwrites that header. Set EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES to your "
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"reverse proxy's IP/CIDR in .env (see docs/install.md)."
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),
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id="evection.W001",
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)
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]
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@@ -74,19 +74,144 @@ def test_too_many_failed_attempts_against_one_username_blocks_that_username(clie
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assert response.wsgi_request.user == bob
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_login_still_works_when_the_throttle_cache_is_down(client, monkeypatch):
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@pytest.fixture
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def cache_down(monkeypatch):
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from unittest.mock import Mock
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from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
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get_user_model().objects.create_user("alice", password="pw-alice-123")
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broken = Mock(side_effect=ConnectionError("redis down"))
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monkeypatch.setattr("apps.accounts.views.cache.get", broken)
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monkeypatch.setattr("apps.accounts.views.cache.incr", broken)
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monkeypatch.setattr("apps.accounts.views.cache.set", broken)
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for name in ("get", "incr", "set"):
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monkeypatch.setattr(f"apps.accounts.throttle.cache.{name}", broken)
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bad = client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"})
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assert bad.status_code == 200
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _reset_local_limiter():
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from .views import login_throttle
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login_throttle._local.clear()
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yield
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login_throttle._local.clear()
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_login_still_works_when_the_throttle_cache_is_down(client, alice, cache_down):
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assert _bad_login(client).status_code == 200
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good = client.post(reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"})
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assert good.status_code == 302
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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def test_a_redis_outage_degrades_to_a_local_limit_instead_of_no_limit(client, alice, cache_down):
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"""R2-S4: previously every attempt was allowed while the cache was
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down, so an outage switched brute-force protection off entirely."""
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for _ in range(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME):
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_bad_login(client)
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blocked = client.post(
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reverse("accounts:login"), {"username": "alice", "password": "pw-alice-123"}
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)
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assert blocked.status_code == 302
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assert blocked.url == reverse("accounts:login"), "even the right password is refused"
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class TestLocalLimiter:
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def test_counts_per_key_and_expires(self, monkeypatch):
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import time as time_module
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from .throttle import LoginThrottle
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throttle = LoginThrottle(window_seconds=60)
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for _ in range(3):
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throttle._local_record("k")
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assert throttle._local_count("k") == 3
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assert throttle._local_count("other") == 0
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real = time_module.monotonic()
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monkeypatch.setattr("apps.accounts.throttle.time.monotonic", lambda: real + 61)
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assert throttle._local_count("k") == 0
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def test_memory_is_bounded(self, monkeypatch):
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from . import throttle as throttle_module
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monkeypatch.setattr(throttle_module, "LOCAL_MAX_KEYS", 5)
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throttle = throttle_module.LoginThrottle(window_seconds=60)
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for i in range(50):
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throttle._local_record(f"k{i}")
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assert len(throttle._local) <= 5
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class TestClientAddress:
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def _request(self, remote, forwarded=None):
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from django.test import RequestFactory
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extra = {"REMOTE_ADDR": remote}
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if forwarded is not None:
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extra["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"] = forwarded
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return RequestFactory().get("/", **extra)
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def test_unset_keeps_the_legacy_first_hop_behavior(self, settings):
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from .throttle import client_address
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = []
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assert client_address(self._request("10.0.0.5", "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.5")) == "1.2.3.4"
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assert client_address(self._request("10.0.0.5")) == "10.0.0.5"
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def test_trusted_proxy_uses_the_rightmost_untrusted_hop_not_the_spoofable_first(self, settings):
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import ipaddress
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from .throttle import client_address
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.5/32")]
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# The client sent "X-Forwarded-For: 6.6.6.6"; the proxy appended the
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# address it actually saw (203.0.113.9).
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request = self._request("10.0.0.5", "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.9")
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assert client_address(request) == "203.0.113.9"
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def test_forwarded_for_from_an_untrusted_peer_is_ignored(self, settings):
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import ipaddress
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from .throttle import client_address
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.5/32")]
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# Someone reaching gunicorn directly and claiming to be 1.2.3.4.
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assert client_address(self._request("198.51.100.7", "1.2.3.4")) == "198.51.100.7"
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def test_chained_trusted_proxies_are_skipped(self, settings):
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import ipaddress
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from .throttle import client_address
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/24")]
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request = self._request("10.0.0.5", "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.7")
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assert client_address(request) == "203.0.113.9"
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def test_trusted_peer_with_no_forwarded_header_falls_back_to_the_peer(self, settings):
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import ipaddress
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from .throttle import client_address
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.5/32")]
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assert client_address(self._request("10.0.0.5")) == "10.0.0.5"
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class TestDeployCheck:
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def test_warns_when_trusted_proxies_is_unset_in_production(self, settings):
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from .checks import trusted_proxies_configured
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settings.DEBUG = False
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = []
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warnings = trusted_proxies_configured(None)
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assert [w.id for w in warnings] == ["evection.W001"]
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def test_quiet_when_configured_or_in_debug(self, settings):
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import ipaddress
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from .checks import trusted_proxies_configured
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settings.DEBUG = False
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.5/32")]
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assert trusted_proxies_configured(None) == []
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settings.DEBUG = True
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settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES = []
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assert trusted_proxies_configured(None) == []
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@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
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"""Login attempt throttling: counters live in the shared cache (Redis) so
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every gunicorn worker sees them, with an in-process fallback when the
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cache is unreachable (R2-S4) — so a Redis outage degrades throttling to
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per-worker limits instead of switching it off for anyone who happens to
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choose that moment."""
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import ipaddress
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import logging
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import threading
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import time
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.core.cache import cache
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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LOCAL_MAX_KEYS = 10_000
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class LoginThrottle:
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def __init__(self, window_seconds: int):
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self.window = window_seconds
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self._lock = threading.Lock()
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self._local: dict[str, tuple[int, float]] = {}
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def is_blocked(self, key: str, limit: int) -> bool:
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try:
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return cache.get(key, 0) >= limit
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except Exception:
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logger.warning("Login throttle cache unavailable; using local limiter")
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return self._local_count(key) >= limit
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def record(self, key: str) -> None:
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try:
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try:
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cache.incr(key)
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except ValueError:
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cache.set(key, 1, self.window)
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except Exception:
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logger.warning("Login throttle cache unavailable; using local limiter")
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self._local_record(key)
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def _local_count(self, key: str) -> int:
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with self._lock:
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entry = self._local.get(key)
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if entry is None or entry[1] <= time.monotonic():
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return 0
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return entry[0]
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def _local_record(self, key: str) -> None:
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now = time.monotonic()
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with self._lock:
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if len(self._local) >= LOCAL_MAX_KEYS:
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self._local = {k: v for k, v in self._local.items() if v[1] > now}
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if len(self._local) >= LOCAL_MAX_KEYS:
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self._local.clear() # under a flood, bounded memory beats perfect memory
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count, expires = self._local.get(key, (0, 0.0))
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if expires <= now:
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count, expires = 0, now + self.window
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self._local[key] = (count + 1, expires)
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def _parse_ip(value: str):
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try:
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return ipaddress.ip_address(value.strip())
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def _is_trusted_proxy(value: str, trusted) -> bool:
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ip = _parse_ip(value)
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return ip is not None and any(ip in network for network in trusted)
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def client_address(request) -> str:
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"""The address to throttle a login attempt by.
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EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated IPs/CIDRs of your reverse
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proxy) makes this strict: X-Forwarded-For is only believed when the
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TCP peer is one of those proxies, and then the *rightmost* entry that
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isn't itself a trusted proxy is used — the address your proxy actually
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saw — rather than the first entry, which is whatever the client chose
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to send. A client reaching gunicorn directly, or a proxy outside the
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list, gets its own peer address.
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Unset (the default), it keeps the previous behavior — trust the first
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X-Forwarded-For entry — which is only safe while gunicorn is reachable
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by nothing but a proxy that overwrites that header (docs/install.md);
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`manage.py check --deploy` warns until it's set.
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"""
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remote = request.META.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "unknown")
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forwarded = [
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part.strip()
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for part in request.META.get("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR", "").split(",")
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if part.strip()
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]
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trusted = settings.EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES
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if not trusted:
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return forwarded[0] if forwarded else remote
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if not _is_trusted_proxy(remote, trusted):
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return remote
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for address in reversed(forwarded):
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if not _is_trusted_proxy(address, trusted):
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return address
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return forwarded[0] if forwarded else remote
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+7
-38
@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ from django.contrib import messages
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from django.contrib.auth import login
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from django.contrib.auth.decorators import user_passes_test
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from django.contrib.auth.views import LoginView as DjangoLoginView
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from django.core.cache import cache
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from django.db import IntegrityError, transaction
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from django.shortcuts import redirect, render
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from .forms import CreateUserForm, SetupForm
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from .middleware import SetupWizardMiddleware
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from .models import SetupLock, User
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from .throttle import LoginThrottle, client_address
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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@@ -27,44 +27,13 @@ LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS = 15
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LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME = 8
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def _client_address(request) -> str:
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# gunicorn is always run behind a reverse proxy in every deployment
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# (see docs/install.md) and its bind address is never meant to be
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# reachable from outside that proxy — the same trust boundary
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# config.settings.prod already relies on for X-Forwarded-Proto. A
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# direct request (e.g. local dev) has no X-Forwarded-For and falls
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# back to REMOTE_ADDR.
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forwarded_for = request.META.get("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR", "")
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if forwarded_for:
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return forwarded_for.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.META.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "unknown")
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login_throttle = LoginThrottle(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS)
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|
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def _attempts_key(kind: str, value: str) -> str:
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return f"login-attempts:{kind}:{value}"
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|
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def _too_many_attempts(key: str, limit: int) -> bool:
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# Fails open if the cache (Redis) is unreachable: logging in must keep
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# working through a cache outage, at the cost of no throttling until
|
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# it's back — an outage shouldn't lock every user out of the app.
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try:
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return cache.get(key, 0) >= limit
|
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except Exception:
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logger.warning("Login throttle cache unavailable; not rate limiting", exc_info=True)
|
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return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _record_failed_attempt(key: str) -> None:
|
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try:
|
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try:
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cache.incr(key)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
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cache.set(key, 1, LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
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logger.warning("Login throttle cache unavailable; attempt not recorded", exc_info=True)
|
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|
||||
|
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class LoginView(DjangoLoginView):
|
||||
"""Wraps Django's own LoginView with the throttle above — everything
|
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else (form, template, redirect behavior) is unchanged."""
|
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@@ -72,11 +41,11 @@ class LoginView(DjangoLoginView):
|
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template_name = "accounts/login.html"
|
||||
|
||||
def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
|
||||
address_key = _attempts_key("addr", _client_address(request))
|
||||
address_key = _attempts_key("addr", client_address(request))
|
||||
username_key = _attempts_key("user", request.POST.get("username", "")[:150])
|
||||
if _too_many_attempts(
|
||||
if login_throttle.is_blocked(
|
||||
address_key, LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_ADDRESS
|
||||
) or _too_many_attempts(username_key, LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME):
|
||||
) or login_throttle.is_blocked(username_key, LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_USERNAME):
|
||||
messages.error(
|
||||
request, "Too many login attempts. Please wait a few minutes and try again."
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -84,8 +53,8 @@ class LoginView(DjangoLoginView):
|
||||
return super().post(request, *args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
def form_invalid(self, form):
|
||||
_record_failed_attempt(_attempts_key("addr", _client_address(self.request)))
|
||||
_record_failed_attempt(_attempts_key("user", self.request.POST.get("username", "")[:150]))
|
||||
login_throttle.record(_attempts_key("addr", client_address(self.request)))
|
||||
login_throttle.record(_attempts_key("user", self.request.POST.get("username", "")[:150]))
|
||||
return super().form_invalid(form)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from datetime import timedelta
|
||||
|
||||
import redis
|
||||
from django.conf import settings
|
||||
from django.core.cache import cache
|
||||
from django.db.models import Max, Min
|
||||
from django.utils import timezone
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +43,33 @@ def _success_window() -> timedelta:
|
||||
return timedelta(minutes=max(3 * base, MIN_SUCCESS_WINDOW_MINUTES))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
PIPELINE_CACHE_KEY = "health-ready-pipeline"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cached_fetch_pipeline_status() -> tuple[dict[str, bool], dict]:
|
||||
"""fetch_pipeline_status, reused for EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS
|
||||
(R2-C5): the queue/feed aggregates behind it cost real queries, and a
|
||||
monitor that polls /health/ready/ every second shouldn't turn that
|
||||
into recurring database and Redis load. The cheap liveness probes
|
||||
(database, Redis, poll heartbeat) are not cached — those stay live.
|
||||
A cache failure just means computing it fresh."""
|
||||
ttl = settings.EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS
|
||||
if ttl > 0:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cached = cache.get(PIPELINE_CACHE_KEY)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
cached = None
|
||||
if cached is not None:
|
||||
return cached
|
||||
result = fetch_pipeline_status()
|
||||
if ttl > 0:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cache.set(PIPELINE_CACHE_KEY, result, timeout=ttl)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fetch_pipeline_status(now=None) -> tuple[dict[str, bool], dict]:
|
||||
"""Checks that fetching is actually *succeeding*, not just scheduled
|
||||
(the poll heartbeat only proves beat and a worker are alive): returns
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -265,3 +265,45 @@ def test_health_ready_flags_most_feeds_failing_but_not_a_single_broken_one(clien
|
||||
assert body["checks"]["feed_failures"] is False
|
||||
assert body["failing_feeds"] == 3
|
||||
assert healthy.pk and broken
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.django_db
|
||||
def test_readiness_reuses_the_pipeline_aggregates_for_a_short_time(client, broker_queue, settings):
|
||||
"""R2-C5: the expensive part of the readiness check is cached briefly,
|
||||
while the cheap liveness probes stay live."""
|
||||
from django.core.cache import cache
|
||||
from django.utils import timezone
|
||||
|
||||
from apps.feeds.tasks import POLL_HEARTBEAT_CACHE_KEY
|
||||
|
||||
settings.EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS = 30
|
||||
cache.set(POLL_HEARTBEAT_CACHE_KEY, timezone.now())
|
||||
Feed.objects.create(feed_url="https://a.example.com/feed.xml")
|
||||
|
||||
first = client.get(reverse("core:health_ready")).json()
|
||||
Feed.objects.create(feed_url="https://b.example.com/feed.xml")
|
||||
second = client.get(reverse("core:health_ready")).json()
|
||||
|
||||
assert first["active_feeds"] == 1
|
||||
assert second["active_feeds"] == 1, "served from the short-lived cache"
|
||||
|
||||
cache.delete("health-ready-pipeline")
|
||||
third = client.get(reverse("core:health_ready")).json()
|
||||
assert third["active_feeds"] == 2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.django_db
|
||||
def test_readiness_liveness_probes_are_never_cached(client, broker_queue, settings):
|
||||
from django.core.cache import cache
|
||||
|
||||
settings.EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS = 30
|
||||
first = client.get(reverse("core:health_ready"))
|
||||
assert first.json()["checks"]["poll_heartbeat"] is False
|
||||
|
||||
from django.utils import timezone
|
||||
|
||||
from apps.feeds.tasks import POLL_HEARTBEAT_CACHE_KEY
|
||||
|
||||
cache.set(POLL_HEARTBEAT_CACHE_KEY, timezone.now())
|
||||
second = client.get(reverse("core:health_ready"))
|
||||
assert second.json()["checks"]["poll_heartbeat"] is True
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from apps.articles.models import Article
|
||||
from apps.feeds.models import Feed, Subscription
|
||||
from apps.feeds.tasks import POLL_HEARTBEAT_CACHE_KEY, enqueue_fetch, reset_backoff
|
||||
|
||||
from .health import fetch_pipeline_status
|
||||
from .health import cached_fetch_pipeline_status
|
||||
|
||||
is_admin = user_passes_test(lambda u: u.is_authenticated and u.is_staff)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ def health_ready(request):
|
||||
checks["poll_heartbeat"] = age <= POLL_HEARTBEAT_MAX_AGE_SECONDS
|
||||
|
||||
if checks["database"]:
|
||||
pipeline_checks, pipeline_detail = fetch_pipeline_status()
|
||||
pipeline_checks, pipeline_detail = cached_fetch_pipeline_status()
|
||||
checks.update(pipeline_checks)
|
||||
detail.update(pipeline_detail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user