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S4: the throttle keyed on the first X-Forwarded-For entry, which a client or a proxy that appends can choose, and disabled itself entirely when Redis was down. EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES (IPs/CIDRs of your reverse proxy) makes it strict: X-Forwarded-For is only believed when the TCP peer is a trusted proxy, and the rightmost entry that isn't itself a trusted proxy — the address the proxy actually saw — is used instead of the spoofable first one. Unset keeps the previous behavior so existing installs don't suddenly share one bucket behind a proxy, and `manage.py check --deploy` warns (evection.W001) until it's set. During a Redis outage the throttle now falls back to a bounded in-process limiter instead of switching off. C5: /health/ready/ reuses its queue/feed aggregates for 15s (EVECTION_HEALTH_CACHE_SECONDS) so a fast-polling monitor can't create steady load; the database, Redis and poller probes stay live. Docs cover both settings, restricting the endpoint at the proxy, and the tombstone/purge behavior from the previous changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -23,3 +23,9 @@ EVECTION_MIN_FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES=15
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# Bump this on deploys that change cached static assets to invalidate old
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# service worker caches.
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EVECTION_PWA_CACHE_VERSION=v1
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# IP address(es) or CIDR(s) of the reverse proxy in front of gunicorn,
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# comma-separated, e.g. 192.168.1.10 or 10.0.0.0/24. When set, the login
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# throttle trusts X-Forwarded-For only from these addresses. Strongly
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# recommended; `manage.py check --deploy` warns until it's set.
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# EVECTION_TRUSTED_PROXIES=
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