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Allow only http(s) URLs from feeds and OPML, at storage and render (R2-S1, #33)
A feed's channel link, an entry's link and an OPML htmlUrl were stored as given and rendered in href attributes (bulk writes skip model validation), so a malicious feed could supply a javascript: or data: link. CSP is a second layer, not the control. apps.core.urlutils accepts only absolute http(s) URLs. Fetching stores channel/entry links through it — relative links now resolve against the feed's own URL instead of being stored as dead relative paths — OPML import skips non-http(s) feed URLs and blanks unsafe htmlUrl, and the add-feed form rejects non-http(s) (URLField also allows ftp). A safe_http_url template filter guards the two places a feed-supplied URL becomes a link (the article's "Original" link and the dashboard), so values already in the database from before this fix are neutralized too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -117,3 +117,14 @@ def test_add_feed_view_rejects_duplicate_subscription(client, two_users):
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assert response.status_code == 302
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assert Subscription.objects.filter(user=alice, feed=feed).count() == 1
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@pytest.mark.django_db
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["ftp://example.com/feed.xml", "javascript:alert(1)"])
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def test_add_feed_rejects_non_http_urls(client, two_users, url):
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client.login(username="alice", password="pw-alice-123")
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response = client.post(reverse("feeds:add_feed"), {"feed_url": url})
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert not Feed.objects.filter(feed_url=url).exists()
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