Allow only http(s) URLs from feeds and OPML, at storage and render (R2-S1, #33)

A feed's channel link, an entry's link and an OPML htmlUrl were stored
as given and rendered in href attributes (bulk writes skip model
validation), so a malicious feed could supply a javascript: or data:
link. CSP is a second layer, not the control.

apps.core.urlutils accepts only absolute http(s) URLs. Fetching stores
channel/entry links through it — relative links now resolve against the
feed's own URL instead of being stored as dead relative paths — OPML
import skips non-http(s) feed URLs and blanks unsafe htmlUrl, and the
add-feed form rejects non-http(s) (URLField also allows ftp). A
safe_http_url template filter guards the two places a feed-supplied URL
becomes a link (the article's "Original" link and the dashboard), so
values already in the database from before this fix are neutralized too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
ksmithandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-11-01 11:57:23 -07:00
1 parent 85914f9107
commit 41f99e9405
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@@ -192,3 +192,21 @@ class TestExportOPML:
exported = export_opml(alice)
assert b"<opml" in exported
assert b"<outline" not in exported
class TestUnsafeOPMLUrls:
def test_non_http_feed_urls_are_skipped_and_unsafe_html_urls_blanked(self):
from io import BytesIO
from apps.feeds.opml import parse_opml
xml = b"""<?xml version="1.0"?><opml version="2.0"><head/><body>
<outline text="Bad" xmlUrl="javascript:alert(1)"/>
<outline text="FTP" xmlUrl="ftp://example.com/feed.xml"/>
<outline text="Good" xmlUrl="https://example.com/feed.xml" htmlUrl="javascript:alert(2)"/>
</body></opml>"""
entries = parse_opml(BytesIO(xml))
assert [e["feed_url"] for e in entries] == ["https://example.com/feed.xml"]
assert entries[0]["site_url"] == ""